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FIRST THINGS FIRST: REDISCOVERING THE
STATES' BILLS OF RIGHTS
Justice Hans A. Lindet
The first annual Judge Irving A. Levine Memorial program
was held on May 16, 1979, in College Park, Maryland. The
topic of the program was "States' Bills of Rights." Justice
Linde's speech, set forth below, addressed the failure of state
courts and lawyers to decide questions of constitutional rights
under their own state constitutions when state law protects
the interest at stake. Justice Linde suggests that a state court
confronted with a constitutional question should always
examine its state constitution before looking to the Federal
Constitution.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Your invitation to join with you on this occasion in honor of
Judge Levine gave me the opportunity to read a number of his
opinions on problems which Maryland's courts face in common with
Oregon's and those of other states, and particularly to reflect on the
independent responsibility of state courts for the conditions of liberty
in their respective states.
Much of the work of the state courts about which Judge Levine
so obviously cared is concerned with the rights of individuals. Yet it
is a curious fact that when we speak of individual rights, not only
the newspaper reading public but no doubt most members of the
legal profession take it for granted that we speak of federal law,
pronounced by the federal courts. This is one phase of our shifting
t B.A., 1947, Reed College; J.D., 1950, University of California, Berkeley;
Associate Professor and Professor of Law, University of Oregon Law School
1959-77; Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Oregon since 1977.
* The program was co-sponsored by the Irving A. Levine Memorial Committee
and the Montgomery County-Prince George's County Continuing Legal
Education Institute of which Judge Levine was a faculty member. Speaking
with Justice Linde at the program were Judge Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr., now
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Charles E.
Moylan, Jr., Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, and Mr. James E. Clayton,
Law Editor for the Washington Post.
The Irving A. Levine Memorial program has since become an annual
event. The topic of the second annual program, held this spring, was the
"Exclusionary Rule." Committee Chairman, Theodore Miller, Esq., has not yet
solidified plans for the program next spring, but intends to continue the
precedent of discussing topical, interesting, and controversial subjects.
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and ambivalent views concerning the role of those courts. Today we
have, on the one hand, proposals to slow or reverse the tide of cases
flowing into the federal courts, and on the other hand a continued
thrust of constitutional challenges against state and local authorities
into the United States District Courts, even in the face of discourag-
ing decisions under the Federal ConstitutiQn.
The state courts, however, take primary responsibility for most
of the individual rights that concern most people most of the time -
for their rights as buyers or sellers, as landlords or tenants, for their
claims to alimony (or to "palimony"), and for their rights to damages
if they are injured on the job or in a traffic accident. State law is
neither immobilized by tradition nor unwilling to recognize social
change in these areas, as developments in products liability and
intrafamily relations show.1 But while state courts routinely assume
their charge to declare individual rights against other individuals or
private entities, the curious fact is that they seldom and hesitantly
assume the same responsibility for individual rights against public
authority. The legal basis for such individual rights in the several
states has always existed, and the courts' responsibility is inescap-
able. Or it would be inescapable, were it not for the working habits
of counsel and the way in which our law schools teach constitutional
law.
This is our topic. We have entitled it: First Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights. I do not mean to deliver a
lecture on all the individual rights that are found in the constitu-
tions of the several states and what they mean. The emphasis is on
the first part of the title - why the states' bills of rights are first
things that come first. I mean initially to review some general
principles that will be familiar and that I hope are uncontroversial
and later to suggest some of the practical consequences should we
decide to take those principles seriously. The suggestion to take
seriously the principle that state bills of rights come first is by no
means uncontroversial.
II. HISTORY
State bills of rights are first in two senses: first in time and first
in logic.
It is common knowledge that the rights all Americans prize,
whether or not they wish to see them enforced, come from the first
1. These comments are particularly true in Maryland. See Phipps v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), wherein the Court of Appeals
of Maryland adopted the theory of strict tort liability under RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966) for some products liability cases. See also
Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978), abrogating the common law
doctrine of interspousal immunity for outrageous intentional torts. For
casenotes on Phipps and Lusby, see 6 U. BAiT. L. REV. 295 (1977) and 8 U. BALT.
L. REV. 584 (1979), respectively.
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ten amendments of the United States Constitution. It is common
knowledge, but of course it is false.
It was not unheard of in 1776, long before the drafting of the
Federal Constitution, for the revolutionaries of that day to declare in
the charters of their new states that the liberty of the press should
be inviolably preserved, or that warrants to search any place or to
seize any person or property must be based on information under
oath and describing the place or the person. Nor was it unusual in
these charters to grant every criminal defendant a right to a speedy
trial before an impartial jury, with the assistance of counsel, to
confront and question the witnesses against him, not to be compelled
to give evidence against himself, nor to be subjected to excessive bail
or fines nor to cruel or unusual punishment.2 I am sure you do not
need a visitor from a wilderness hardly known to exist before 1804 to
quote to you from Maryland's Declaration of Rights of November,
1776. By 1783, thirteen states, all but Rhode Island, had adopted
written constitutions. The majority of them contained most of the
catalogue of civil liberties included in Virginia's Declaration of
Rights, and Maryland's, and Delaware's, and Pennsylvania's. But
they were by no means identical. That was no accident. During the
months preceding independence, political leaders debated the case
for having the Continental Congress prepare uniform constitutions
for the states. They finally rejected this idea in favor of calling upon
each state to write a constitution satisfactory to itselfA
Far from being the model for the states, the Federal Bill of
Rights was added to the Constitution to meet demands for the same
guarantees against the new central government that people had
secured against their own local officials. Moreover, the states that
adopted new constitutions during the following decades took their
bills of rights from the preexisting state constitutions rather than
from the federal amendments. For example, Oregon's constitution in
1859 adopted Indiana's copy of Ohio's version of sources found in
Delaware and elsewhere.
The Federal Bill of Rights did not supersede those of the states.
It was not interposed between the citizen and his state. When the
fifth amendment was invoked against the City of Baltimore in 1833,
John Marshall replied that its adoption "could never have occurred
to any human being, as a mode of doing that which might be effected
by the state itself."4 Only the Civil War made it clear that it might
sometimes be necessary to use federal law as a mode of doing that
2. See, e.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 19, 20, 22, 23, 38.
3. F. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-
1860, at 52-56 (1930).
4. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 242 (1833).
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which a state could but did not effect for itself - the protection of
some of its citizens against those in control of its government.
It is the fourteenth amendment that has bound the states to
observe the guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights. I do not
underestimate that crucial role of the fourteenth amendment. But
the effect has gone beyond assuring that state officials respect the
rights guaranteed by federal law. It has led many state courts and
the lawyers who practice before them to ignore the state's law,
enforcing only those personal rights guaranteed by federal law, or to
assume that the state's own guarantees must reflect whatever the
United States Supreme Court finds in their federal analogues.
We tend to forget how recently the application of the Federal
Bill of Rights to the states developed. Throughout the nineteenth
century and the first quarter of the twentieth, state courts decided
questions of constitutional rights under their own state constitu-
tions. In 1925, it was only a hypothesis that the states were bound by
the first amendment.' That was really settled only after 1937.6 Fifth
amendment guarantees against compulsory self-incrimination and
double jeopardy did not bind the states until 1964 and 1969,
respectively.7 I shall not go through the catalogue; most of the
decisions binding the states to observe the procedures of the fourth,
fifth, and sixth amendments date from the same period.' Of course,
the states had all these guarantees in their own laws long before the
Federal Bill of Rights was applied to the states. State courts had
been administering these laws, sometimes generously, more often
not, for a century or more without awaiting an interpretation from
the United States Supreme Court.
Historically, the states' commitment to individual rights came
first. Restraints on the federal government were patterned upon the
states' declarations of rights. Even in modern times the United
States Supreme Court has sometimes looked to that original history
to interpret a federal clause.9 But today, most state courts look to
interpretations of the Federal Bill of Rights for the meaning of their
5. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (first amendment not used to invalidate Oregon statute which
would effectively close religious primary schools).
6. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
7. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
8. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by jury); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400(1965) (right to confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the exclusionary rule).
9. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). An earlier, interesting
example arising in Maryland was In re Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (1955).
382 [Vol. 9
States' Bills of Rights
own state constitutions, in the rare cases when they consider them at
all.
III. THE LOGIC OF FEDERALISM
Just as rights under the state constitutions were first in time,
they are first also in the logic of constitutional law. For lawyers, the
point is quickly made. Whenever a person asserts a particular right,
and a state court recognizes and protects that right under state law,
then the state is not depriving the person of whatever federal claim
he or she might otherwise assert. There is no federal question.
Every state supreme court, I suppose, has declared that it will
not needlessly decide a case on a constitutional ground if other legal
issues can dispose of the case. The identical principle applies when
examining that part of the state's law which is in its own
constitution. In my view, a state court should always consider its
state constitution before the Federal Constitution. It owes its state
the respect to consider the state constitutional question even when
counsel does not raise it, which is most of the time. The same court
probably would not let itself be pushed into striking down a state
law before considering that law's proper interpretation. The princi-
ple is the same.10
Let us avoid any misunderstanding. The United States Constitu-
tion is the supreme law of the land. Nothing in the state's law or
constitution can diminish a federal right. But no state court needs
or, in my view, ought to hold that the law of its state denies what the
Federal Constitution demands, without at least discussing the
guarantees provided in its own bill of rights. In fact, Justices of the
Supreme Court frequently invite a state court to do just that, usually
when those Justices disagree with the majority's decision of the
federal issue presented. As Chief Justice Burger once observed, "for
all we know, the state courts would find this statute invalid under
the State Constitution, but no one on either side of the case thought
to discuss this or exhibit any interest in the subject."" Justices
Brennan and Marshall, disappointed at decisions that have reversed
10. Justice Marshall has suggested that the United States Supreme Court refrain
from reversing a state judgment in favor of a defendant relying on constitu-
tional grounds "unless it is quite clear that the state court has resolved all
applicable state law questions adversely to the defendant and that it feels
compelled by its view of the federal constitutional issue to reverse the
conviction at hand." Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 729 (1975) (dissenting
opinion); see Galie & Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Supreme Court
Review: Justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon v. Hass, 82 DICK. L. REV. 273
(1978). I have stated elsewhere that lower federal courts also should inquire
into state constitutional guarantees when plaintiffs attack state action on
federal constitutional grounds. See Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REV. 325
(1973).
11. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 440 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19801
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state courts when they protected a claim under the fourteenth
amendment, have issued frequent reminders that the state courts
could have reached the same decisions under the state constitution.12
Granted, a state court might often reach the opposite result
under the state constitution and bend only to the external compul-
sion of the fourteenth amendment. A state constitution does not
always protect whatever the Federal Constitution protects. But a
state court should put things in their logical sequence and routinely
examine its state law first, before reaching a federal issue.
IV. EXAMPLES: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WITHOUT THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Let me illustrate these principles with a few examples.
Judge Levine had a special interest in freedom of expression.
His specialty was its relationship to the law of defamation. As
everyone knows, the law of defamation became a matter of
constitutional law only in 1964, when the United States Supreme
Court decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.3 Everyone knows
this, but again, it is false. From the first declarations of rights in
1776 to the present day, freedom of the press in state constitutions
has often been coupled with specific provisions for the trial of libel
cases. The problem facing the United States Supreme Court since
1964 has been how to square recovery for defamation with the first
amendment. The first amendment, of course, made no reference to
defamation, because tort law was not within the powers granted to
Congress at all.
The Oregon Supreme Court has had the same experience in
defamation.cases that I am sure every court has had since 1964. We
have received elaborate briefs debating whether the plaintiff is or is
not a public figure, what degree of recklessness with the truth can
constitute malice, whether the constitutional protection is limited to
so-called "media defendants,"" and so on. The scholarly literature on
these first amendment issues is so extensive that it has largely
displaced the discussion of libel and slander as a branch of torts. But
the briefs and the literature rarely, if ever, mention the state
constitutions.
Yet the Oregon Supreme Court, like some others, had to decide a
constitutional issue of defamation law well before the New York
12. E.g., Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977); Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). See also New
Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. See id.
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Times case. 5 The Oregon Constitution since 1859 has provided that
"every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done
him in his person, property, or reputation."'6 Unlike a due process
clause, this remedies clause is derived from chapter forty of Magna
Carta, rather than chapter thirty-nine. 7 Maryland's 1776
Declaration of Rights made the same promise of a remedy for injuries
done to one's person or property, but it did not mention injury to
one's reputation.18 The question in Oregon was whether a statute
that limited the recovery for libel when a newspaper printed a
retraction violated this guarantee of a remedy for injury to
reputation. The court held that the particular statute did not do so.
Along with the guarantee of a remedy against defamation, the
Oregon Constitution includes an equally ancient guarantee of
freedom of expression. Article I, section 8 reads: "No law shall be
passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the
right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but
every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right."' 9
Maryland has a similar clause.20 Recently our court has had a
number of cases in which juries awarded punitive damages for libel."'
Some of the briefs debated whether the facts met the tests laid down
by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 and whether
Gertz applied to defendants who did not belong to what the first
amendment calls the "press." Finally, one defendant threw into this
long discussion of Supreme Court cases a citation to Oregon's article
I, section 8, albeit without much discussion.
15. See Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting Co., 228 Or. 405, 365 P.2d 845, cert. denied,
370 U.S. 157 (1961).
16. OR, CONST. art. I, § 10.
17. Chapter 39, the "due process" clause of the Magna Carta, guarantees that "[n]o
free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseized or outlawed or exiled or in
any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful
judgement of his peers or by the law of the land." Chapter 40, upon which the
quoted Oregon constitutional provision is based, reads: "To no one will we sell,
to no one will we deny or delay right or justice." MAGNA CARTA, 1215, chs. 39,
40.
18. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19 grants only: "That every man, for any
injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the
course of the Law of the land,..."
19. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8.
20. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 40: "That the liberty of the press ought to
be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that privilege."
21. See Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1979); Adams v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 283 Or. 45, 581 P.2d 507 (1977); Harley-Davidson
Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977).
22. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Under Gertz, the Supreme Court would not allow states to
permit a non-public person to recover punitive damages for defamation "at
least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 349.
1980]
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In deciding this case,23 we noted that section 8 does not speak of
a special freedom of the press.' Nor, for that matter, does it
distinguish between different subjects of comment. It forbids any law
restricting anyone's right to speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatever, though it holds him responsible for the abuse of
this right. We put this section together with the guarantee of a
remedy for injury done to a plaintiff in his reputation. We concluded
that the two provisions are two sides of one coin: a person who
defames another is responsible for the actual injury he does to
another. But he cannot be held liable for punitive damages, because
punitive damages by definition are punishment on behalf of society
and not compensation for the plaintiffs injury. The result was to
exclude punitive damages in all defamation cases in Oregon, without
regard to the distinctions between types of plaintiffs and defendants
and degrees of fault that are found in the first amendment cases.
You may or may not find this decision sound. It might be good
law under the Maryland Constitution or it might not be. That very
independence of the states' laws, in fact, is my main point. What is
interesting is that our court had no earlier occasion to decide the
question; it had never been raised. On the same day this decision
came down, we affirmed punitive damages in another libel case.24 In
that case, the defendant made no objection to such damages in the
trial court, presumably because he saw no help in the federal first
amendment cases.
Apart from defamation, our court has protected what are usually
called first amendment freedoms without depending on the first
amendment. In 1975, the court held under article I, section 8 of the
Oregon Constitution that limits on political campaign spending
unlawfully restricted the right to speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatever. 25 The United States Supreme Court followed suit
under the first amendment a year later in Buckley v. Valeo 6 Again,
a claim can lose under Oregon's article I, section 8 as well as under
the first amendment. 7 But our court is willing to look at these as two
23. Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1979).
24. Troutman v. Erlandson, 286 Or. 47, 593 P.2d 793 (1979).
25. Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975).
26. 421 U.S. 1 (1976).
27. Since this speech was delivered, the Oregon Supreme Court has relied on OR.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (see text accompanying note 19 supra) to hold that a
disorderly conduct statute on its face restricted freedom of speech because the
statute was directed at the use of offensive words rather than at any harm
caused thereby. State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 611 P.2d 1147 (1980).
When a newspaper demanded access to juvenile court proceedings,
apparently not guaranteed by the first amendment under Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Oregon Supreme Court held that public
access to all court proceedings was assured by OR. CONST. art. I, § 10 that "[n]o
court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly ...... State ex
rel Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277, 613 P.2d 23 (1980).
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separate issues. It is careless of counsel not to pursue them both
independently, as some later examples will show.
V. PUTTING THE PRINCIPLE INTO PRACTICE
Let us examine what putting first things first means in practice,
both for courts and for the practitioner.
When a state court deals with constitutional claims that do not
currently occupy the United States Reports, the state court is quite
accustomed to making its own analysis under the state constitution.
Commonplace examples are issues of the condemnation of property
for public use or alleged disparities of assessments for taxation. But
when the issue arises in an area in which the Supreme Court has
been active, lawyers generally stop citing the state's own law and
decisions to the state court, and the court abandons reference to the
state constitution. Such reference to the state constitution reappears
only when counsel and the state court wish to extend a constitu-
tional right beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court and to do so
without facing possible reversal on certiorari. In other words, the
normal and logical sequence is reversed: counsel and court first
determine whether the state has violated the Federal Constitution,
and only when it has not done so do they reach a question of state
law. That practice stands the Constitution on its head.
The tactic of using the state constitution only selectively is best
illustrated by two famous California cases concerning equal protec-
tion. In Serrano v. Priest,21 the California Supreme Court held that
the amount spent on public schools could not depend on the different
tax bases available to rich and to poor local school districts. The
opinion was written in the terminology of federal equal protection
doctrine, with only a passing reference to California's own article I,
section 21.29 That section forbade laws granting to any citizen or
class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens. This is a common
provision which is older than the fourteenth amendment and
independent of its context of race discrimination. Before the Serrano
litigation was concluded, the United States Supreme Court rejected
the same equal protection claim in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.30 Thereafter, the California court reaffirmed its
original holding under the California clause.31
One might think that, having discovered the clause in the
California Constitution prohibiting laws granting to any class of
28. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
29. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21 (current version at § 7).
30. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
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citizens privileges which are not equally open to all citizens on the
same terms, the California court either would have found the clause
relevant to Allen Bakke's attack on the preferential admissions
system at the medical school in Davis,32 or that the court would at
least discuss why not. Indeed, California amended its constitution in
1974 to provide expressly that the "rights guaranteed by this
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. '33 But that discussion of equality of privileges
did not occur. In Bakke v. Regents of the University of California,34
the California court studiously bypassed all preliminary issues of
state law and placed its decision squarely on the fourteenth
amendment, so as to invite Supreme Court review of this controver-
sial issue. The court did not seem concerned about the implication
that the law of California offered Mr. Bakke no protection for a right
to which the court, rightly or wrongly, believed him to be entitled.3 5
From the lawyer's standpoint, the state's bill of rights may seem
utterly irrelevant when the federal precedents are squarely in his
favor. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to ignore the state guarantee. In
the early 1970's, lawyers invariably took every civil liberties case to
the federal district court. One very good lawyer did just that in
Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., Ltd.36 The plaintiffs in that case were denied
the right to distribute anti-war leaflets in a large shopping center in
Portland. On the basis of existing Supreme Court decisions, both the
federal district court 37 and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
32. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680 (1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
34. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1977), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
35. Since this speech was delivered, the California Supreme Court has applied the
state constitution rather than the federal equal protection clause as well as
statutory law to hold that a public utility company unlawfully discriminated
against employment of homosexuals. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
Other recent California decisions relying on state constitutional provisions
include: Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149
(1980) (bail practices invalidated under state due process clause); City of Santa
Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980)
(ordinance prohibiting five or more unrelated persons from residing in
single-family home violated state constitutional right of privacy); San Fran-
cisco Labor Council v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal. 3d 785, 608 P.2d 277,
163 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1980) (statute requiring university to pay prevailing wages
in community violated state constitutional provision establishing independence
of university); People v. Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d 368, 605 P.2d 843, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1980) (evidence of interviews between defendant and police violated state
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).
36. 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Or. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
37. Id.
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Circuit" sustained the claim under the first amendment; no one
bothered with the Oregon Constitution. By the time the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed its prior direction,39 it was of
course too late.
I would guess that if the plaintiff from the outset had invoked
the Oregon Constitution's free speech and assembly provisions, these
provisions would have been interpreted consistently with the
existing first amendment precedents in the plaintiff's favor. After
the reversal under the first amendment, lawyers who had litigated a
similar shopping center case in state court and had relied on the
lower federal court's decision against the Lloyd Center tried
belatedly to switch their argument to the Oregon Constitution, but
they found that the Oregon court was reluctant to contradict the
Supreme Court's Lloyd Corp. decision.40 California, incidentally, has
done so under its constitution.4
Many other cases show that what is sound in theory is also
intensely practical. In recent years, state courts have often found
themselves reversed by the Supreme Court when they decided in
favor of some individual right on the basis of the United States
Constitution.4' An Alabama court, for instance, held that an
employer could not be made to pay an employee while on jury duty.43
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a gross receipts tax on
parking lots took the operators' property without due process.44 The
Idaho court thought that its unemployment benefit rules violated the
equal protection clause.45 These decisions indeed may not have been
good fourteenth amendment law and deserved to be reversed. But I
venture to say that in every case the court could have cited the
state's own constitution for its holding. Some years ago, for example,
in Maryland Board of Pharmacy v. Save-A -Lot, Inc.,46 Judge Levine
38. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., Ltd., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 551
(1972).
39. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), rev'g 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1971).
40. See Lenrich Assocs. v. Heyda, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972); 52 OR. L. REV.
338 (1973).
41. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 22 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4650 (U.S. 1980).
42, The Supreme Court has reversed state supreme courts under these circum-
stances more than 20 times since the October, 1972, term. The most recent
decisions reaching this result include Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31
(1979); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); and North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369 (1979).
43. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp. v. Dean, 49 Ala. App. 45, 268 So. 2d 829, cert.
denied, 289 Ala. 743, 268 So. 2d 834 (1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 543 (1973).
44. Alco Parking Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. 245, 307 A.2d 851 (1973),
rev'd, 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
45. Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Employment, 98 Idaho 43, 557 P.2d 637 (1976), rev'd,
434 U.S. 100 (1977).
46. 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973).
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reaffirmed the doctrine that in Maryland due process requires
statutes to have a substantial relation to some identified objective,
notwithstanding what the Supreme Court might say. I have little
enthusiasm for that doctrine,47 but I am the first to say Maryland is
entitled to it under its own constitution. Without the Maryland
Constitution, the court might have found itself reversed, as the
North Dakota court was when it thought it was following an old
federal due process case that had escaped being expressly overruled
in the 1940's.48
The lesson, I suggest, is that a claim under the state's own law
must be more than a perfunctory afterthought. First things first.
Indeed, when a court ties a state constitutional guarantee as a tail to
the kite of the corresponding federal clause, it may simply find the
state ground ignored on certiorari, as happened recently in Delaware
v. Prouse.9 But the habit that developed in the 1960's of making a
federal case of every claim and looking for all law in Supreme Court
opinions dies hard.
Eager legal aid lawyers once came to our court trying to fit a
woman's right to operate a day care center within the due process
analysis of Goldberg v. Kelly.5 ° Only after the argument did our own
examination show that she was entitled to prevail under the state
administrative procedure act, which counsel apparently had not
read."
In another recent case, a defendant charged with speeding
demanded the maintenance records of the radar sets used by the
Portland police.5 2 The case was argued below and in our court as a
federal due process claim under the Supreme Court's rule in Brady v.
47. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 195 (1976).
48. See North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S.
156 (1973).
49. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Justice White's opinion states:
The [Delaware] court analyzed the various decisions interpreting the
Federal Constitution, concluded that the Fourth Amendment foreclosed
spot checks of automobiles, and summarily held that the state
constitution was therefore also infringed. . . . Had state law not been
mentioned at all, there would be no question about our jurisdiction,
even though the state constitution might have provided an independent
and adequate state ground. . . .The same result should follow here
where the state constitutional holding depended upon the state court's
view of the reach of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 652-53. Justice White expanded this proposition: "Moreover, every case
holding a search or seizure to be contrary to the state constitutional provision
relies on cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment and simultaneously
concludes that the search or seizure is contrary to that provision .... " Id. at
652-53 n.5. See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1979)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
50. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
51. Reynolds v. Children's Servs. Div., 280 Or. 431, 571 P.2d 505 (1977).
52. State v. Spada, 286 Or. 305, 594 P.2d 815 (1979).
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Maryland,53 which dealt with prosecution suppression of evidence
favorable to the defense. After the argument, it occurred to us that
the records were apparently available to anyone on request under
the state's public records law. We asked the parties for additional
memoranda. The state agreed that the records were, indeed,
available; all defendant had to do was pick them up for himself
instead of demanding that the district attorney get them for him.
Defense counsel's response was that this might be so, but that the
"threshold question" in the case was the duty of the state in light of
the United States constitutional standards; the merits of other legal
ways of getting the information were irrelevant.
As I say, that perspective dies hard. In both of these cases, we
happened to notice on our own motion that the state law protected
the interest at stake. But if we had not noticed the state issues on
our own, the shaky federal due process claims might well have
failed.
What this should mean in practice is simply good lawyering,
both at the bar and on the bench. If we expect to get careful
attention to a state statute, we should give equally careful attention
to the state constitution. This is easier said than done. A generation
of lawyers brought up on United States Supreme Court opinions
seems literally speechless when we ask from the bench, as we
sometimes do, how we should decide a constitutional question if the
Supreme Court has never addressed it. Yet a lawyer must ask
himself precisely that question if he wants the court to take
seriously his argument under the state constitution.
Some state constitutions have recently added new guarantees
that do not repeat clauses in the Federal Constitution. One is an
express guarantee of a right of "privacy." State courts and counsel
cannot escape facing the issue of what that term means. In Alaska, it
includes a constitutional right to smoke marijuana in your home.5
Another provision peculiar to state constitutions is the equal rights
amendment now adopted in Maryland55 and many other states. I note
that your highest court has carefully compared the Maryland text
with somewhat different versions elsewhere and has concluded that
the amendment is not subject to the kind of analysis which the
Supreme Court uses under the equal protection clause."
53. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
54. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
55. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46.
56. Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980) (decided subsequent to this
speech); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977). See Comment, The
Maryland Equal Rights Amendment: Eight Years of Application, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 342, 351-52 (1980).
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The same is true when the state's provision is textually the
same as one in the Federal Constitution. In such a case, as the
Hawaii Supreme Court has said, an "opinion of the United States
Supreme Court . . . is merely another source of authority, admit-
tedly to be afforded respectful consideration, but which we are free to
accept or reject in establishing the outer limits of protection afforded
by the Hawaii Constitution." 7 Remember, the state clause was
usually first, at least when traced to the state where it originated.
But to make an independent argument under the state clause takes
homework - in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to
analysis. It is not enough to ask the state court to reject a Supreme
Court opinion on the comparable federal clause merely because one
prefers the opposite result. Counsel would do well to begin his
memoranda and briefs with a fresh, well-considered argument to the
court why he should win under the state constitution and relegate
all the old, familiar shorthand about first, fourth, fifth, or sixth
amendment rights, "automobile exceptions," "Miranda warnings,"
"clear and present danger," and the rest of the federal phraseology to
a short final section. Once these federal claims are properly invoked
with supporting citations, the court will have to deal with them in
any event.
VI. CONCLUSION
Let us conclude by considering whether independent attention to
the states' bills of rights is a good thing. As I have said, logically it is
not a matter of lawyer's tactics or judicial strategy. If the state in
fact has a law protecting some claimed right, the law should be
followed, and if it applies to the case, there is no federal question.
On first impression, the idea of constitutional rights that are not
pronounced by the United States Supreme Court, rights that are not
common to all Americans but differ from state to state, may strike
people as vaguely disquieting. This is partly the consequence of the
nationalization of news coverage, which centers national attention
on Washington, D.C., and which reduces and homogenizes the
public's view of law to whatever end results come out of the Supreme
Court, without regard to the Court's legal premises.
As lawyers we know very well that individual rights differ from
state to state. That is what a federal system means. But even
lawyers have difficulty in thinking about constitutional law as
something apart from Supreme Court opinions. This is because, like
the news media, the law schools have nationalized legal education,
and constitutional law books deal exclusively with the opinions of
the United States Supreme Court. Perhaps, if we could develop more
57. State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974).
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constitutional law courses that are built around the issues and the
choices which exist throughout our fifty-one constitutions and that
would treat the opinions of judges as historic but not infallible
struggles with those issues and choices, then more new lawyers
could live up to Judge Levine's admonition to the new lawyers
admitted to the Maryland Bar to give their attention to the
Maryland Constitution.8 Moreover, if state constitutions are again
taken seriously by the courts and the lawyers who appear before
them, they will eventually be taken seriously again by state
legislatures, administrative agencies, city councils, school boards,
and by the attorneys general, city solicitors, and private counsel who
advise them, even outside litigation as such.
There is, of course, a contrary view. Diversity between state and
federal constitutional rights complicates the work of lawyers and
courts, particularly below the state supreme court. The law is
complicated enough. There is little to be gained in return for the
trouble. The game is not worth the candle.
The experience on our Oregon court is that state law, including
the state constitution, generally gets independent attention, with
one exception. The exception comes when guarantees against police
conduct have to be enforced by the exclusion of evidence. 9 I do not
include all the rights relating to criminal procedure. The court has
sometimes given independent importance to the guarantee against
double jeopardy. 6° We have held that the Oregon Constitution
guarantees trial by jury in all criminal cases, not excluding so-called
petty offenses." In Maryland, as Judge Levine observed, juries must
be unanimous,6 though the Supreme Court has allowed 10-2 verdicts
in Oregon as far as federal due process is concerned.' Oregon
required indictment by grand jury long after many states allowed
prosecution on an information. But when it comes to the fourth
amendment and to police questioning of suspects, the majority of the
court pretty much lets the United States Supreme Court tell us what
58. Address by Judge Levine to newly admitted members of the Maryland Bar
(December 1977).
59. Oregon adopted the exclusionary rule long before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). See State v. McDaniel, 115 Or. 187, 231 P. 965, aff'd on rehearing, 237
P. 373 (1925); State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443, 204 P. 958, rehearing denied, 206
P. 290 (1922).
60. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972).
61. Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977).
62. State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 375 A.2d 228 (1977).
63. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S, 404 (1972).
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our state constitution does or does not mean.' Some justices are
reluctant to state an independent position on searches or confessions
because it might go further to suppress evidence than the Supreme
Court requires.
That course has logical difficulties. If we construe the search and
seizure clause of our state constitutions to follow the latest Supreme
Court holding under the fourth amendment, for instance with
respect to search of an automobile trunk, what is the state's law
when the Supreme Court changes direction in the next automobile
search case? What should a lower court do: follow the last previous
decision under the state constitution or a later, more permissive one
by the United States Supreme Court?
On the other hand, we have suppressed evidence when a police
search violated a state statute,' just as one of Judge Levine's
opinions suppressed a statement obtained when a suspect was not
taken before a magistrate."
In short, our practice, like that of many state courts, has been
inconsistent. Perhaps the question whether a state court should
decide cases under its own bill of rights will rarely change a result.
Nevertheless, I think, as Judge Levine did, that the revival of state
court concern with state bills of rights is important.
First, decisions applying the state's own bill of rights can make
people aware of their responsibility for the law of their state. State
statutes and constitutions are easily amended. Sometimes they are
64. See State v. Greene, 285 Or. 337, 591 P.2d 1362 (1979); State v. Flores, 280 Or.
273, 570 P.2d 965 (1977); State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974).
Since this speech was delivered, however, the Oregon Supreme Court has
repeatedly relied on independent state grounds to enforce procedural as well as
substantive rights of suspects or defendants in criminal cases, including the
suppression of prosecution evidence. See State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d
94 (1980) (statute prohibiting possession of a "billy" held contrary to
constitutional right of "the people . . . to bear arms for the defense of
themselves, . . ."); State v. Scharf, 288 Or. 451, 605 P.2d 690 (1980) (breath
test evidence of intoxication inadmissible after denial of counsel); State v.
Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979) (confession to psychiatrist prior
to arraignment held tainted by previous inadmissible confessions); State v.
Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979) (right to counsel when counsel seeks to
talk to defendant in custody, unless such right is voluntarily and intelligently
waived); State v. Rathbun, 287 Or. 421, 600 P.2d 392 (1979) (double jeopardy
bars retrial caused by bailiff's improper remarks to jury); State v. Roper, 286
Or. 621, 595 P.2d 1247 (1979) (constitutional venue in county where conspiracy
was formed); State v. Sims, 287 Or. 349, 599 P.2d 461 (1979) (same); State v.
Smyth, 286 Or. 293, 593 P.2d 1166 (1979) (right to confront foreign witness).
65. State v. Valdez, 277 Or. 621, 561 P.2d 1006 (1977).
66. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1977). But see State v. Shipley,
232 Or. 354, 375 P.2d 237 (1962).
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amended to reinstate capital punishment67 or to allow discrimination
in housing," as happened in California. Sometimes they are
amended to add an equal rights amendment or a right of privacy. 69
Whatever they may be, they lead all of us to face closer to home
some fundamental values that the public has become accustomed to
have decided for them by the faraway oracles in the marble temple.
If we had to choose, we might be reluctant to put much of the
bill of rights to a referendum. Fortunately, we do not have to choose.
The irreducible national standards, as declared from time to time by
the United States Supreme Court, bind us in any event. No state can
choose to reject them. But neither are the people of any state bound
to be satisfied with the minimum standard allowed to all.
The second reason is so old it is hardly remembered: constitu-
tions are rules for government. We have recalled here that the
people of Maryland and the other original states first adopted their
own declarations of rights and thereafter insisted that these be
honored also by the new national power they created over them all.
If federal officials doubted what rights they were bound to respect,
these were basically the rights declared in one form or another from
Massachusetts to Georgia.
In modern times, these axioms have been reversed. It became
the assumption, not without cause, that the states would have to
learn constitutional law from Washington, D.C. Yet there have been
occasions when the older view would have stood us in good stead. I
do not recall many constitutional lawyers inquiring, five years ago,
whether the chief executive of a state could demand an injunction
against newspaper publication of papers prepared in a government
department, or whether he could order police burglaries in pursuit of
some important state interest, or whether his appointees could as-
sert executive privilege against questions in a court or a legislative
committee, all powers that the President claimed to be inherent in
the executive office. Yet the obvious answers would have been
enlightening about the American law of executive power when a
source of enlightenment was badly needed. Similarly, what reason is
there for confidence that the national version of the first amend-
ment, or the fourth, or the fifth, will always be the best the nation
could want?
67. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art I, § 27. This section was enacted on November 7, 1972,
following the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.
3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972),
which declared the death penalty a violation of California's constitutional
protection against cruel or unusual punishment.
68. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
69. E.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGwTs art. 46 (equal rights amendment); ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 22 (right to privacy).
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Congressmen, Senators, Presidents, go to Washington from state
governments. Even some federal judges have been state judges.
Might it not be a good idea if they came from a living tradition of
respecting the constitutions and the bills of rights of their states and
went to Washington expecting the federal government to do as well?
For that perspective, however, we would have to turn our
constitutional law right side up and once again put first things first.
The lead, I suggest, must come not only from law schools, but also
from state courts and from the lawyers who appear before those
courts.7 0
70. The thesis argued in these remarks has given rise to an extensive modern
literature, including the following: Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State
Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972); Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Countryman, Why
a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); Falk, Foreward: The State
Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REV. 273
(1973); Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a
Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 125 (1969); Galie & Galie, State Constitutional
Guarantees and Supreme Court Review: Justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon
v. Hass, 82 DICK L. REV. 273 (1978); Graves, State Constitutional Law: A
Twenty-Five Year Summary, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1966); Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV.
873 (1976); Lipson, Serrano v. Priest, I and II. The Continuing Role of the
California Supreme Court in Deciding Questions Arising Under the California
Constitution, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 697 (1976); Mosk, The Constitution of California
in the Era of the Burger Court and States' Rights, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 19, 1973,
Report Section, at 26-29; Rees, State Constitutional Law For Maryland
Lawyers: Individual Civil Rights, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 299 (1978); Wilkes, The
New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 KY. L. J. 421, 437-43 (1974); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L. J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 KY. L. J. 729 (1976); Comment, Robinson at
Large in the Fifty States: A Continuation of the State Bills of Rights Debate in
the Search and Seizure Context, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 1 (1975); Comment,
Camping on Adequate State Grounds: California Ensures the Reality of
Constitutional Ideals, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 1157 (1977); Note, State Constitutional
Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court Review and Problems ofFederalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737 (1976); Note, Of Laboratories a~'d
Liberties: State Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REV. 53d
(1976); Note, Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8
HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973); Note, Rediscovering the California
Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 481 (1975); Note, Freedom of
Expression Under State Constitutions, 20 STAN. L. REV. 318 (1968); Note, The
New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution,
29 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1977); Note, Expanding Criminal Procedure Rights Under
State Constitutions, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 909 (1976).
Since this speech was delivered, these titles have appeared: Deukmejian &
Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor - Judicial Review Under the California
Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1979); Symposium, An Examination of
the Wisconsin Constitution, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 483 passim (1979). Much of this
literature discusses, however, whether and why state constitutions should have
independent attention rather than how this should be done in practice. There is
obviously much room for textual, historical, and principled analysis of the
several states. See, e.g., Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in
Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970). One good starting point for historical sources
is SHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971), reviewed in
Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REV. 325 (1973).
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